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Of Chew Toys and Designer Handbags:
A Critical Analysis of the "Parody" Exception
under the U.S. Trademark Dilution Revision Act
EUGENE C. LIM*
INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly competitive business world, securing and
maintaining an advantage over one's rivals in the marketplace is a
perennial challenge. In this regard, the distinctiveness of a well-established
and renowned trademark is perhaps one of the most cherished and jealously
guarded assets that a modem business can possess. Yet famous trademarks
are also popular targets of ridicule and satire. To what extent should
trademark law in the United States allow individuals to poke fun at and
lampoon well-known trade symbols that are used to sell goods or services
in the marketplace? Does the existing "parody" provision in the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of the United States provide adequate protection to
famous trademarks while striking a fair balance between intellectual
property rights and the freedom of expression?
In the United States, the right to freedom of expression is
constitutionally enshrined in the First Amendment.' As in many other
liberal democracies, the First Amendment right to freedom of expression in
the United States is not absolute and is subject to limitations and other
curtailments imposed by the law.2 Trademark law, for instance, restricts
the extent to which commercial signs and symbols, in which intellectual
* School of Law, City University of Hong Kong. This article was inspired in part by a
conference-"Charting the New Frontiers of Intellectual Property Protection of Luxury
Goods"-organized by the Law & Technology Centre at the University of Hong Kong in
June 2012. The author wishes to thank the editorial board at the Campbell Law Review for
their efficiency and prompt feedback on an earlier version of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.").
2. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Also known as the "Copyright Clause," this
clause confers upon the United States Congress the mandate "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
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property rights subsist, can be used by members of the public without
authorization from the relevant trademark proprietors.
An interesting legal issue relating to liability arises when individuals
adapt and transform existing trade symbols in a humorous, amusing, or
entertaining way-sometimes in a manner that is damaging to the
reputations of the trademark owners-either to poke fun at the symbols or
to convey a message to the public.4  The transformation, adaptation, or
reconfiguration of an existing work or symbol into a new form for the
purpose of humor or entertainment is often referred to as the process of
"parodying" the original work.5 The parody invariably contains elements
that are reminiscent of the original work, so that the process of derivation is
clear to the ordinary viewer.6 A successful parody must contain original
elements of its own to be clever and innovative and yet must not be so
transformed that its link to the original work is severed or unrecognizable.7
In the words of the United States Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, the parody "needs to mimic an original to make its point."' That is
the hallmark of a parody-to present itself as an amusing or witty
adaptation of the original, without claiming to be the original work itself.9
The extent to which parodies are allowed under U.S. trademark law,
particularly parodies that also designate the source of goods or services,
will have a significant impact on the degree to which protected signs and
symbols can be used as building blocks of human communication in
American civil society. This will, in turn, influence the shape and character
of artistic expression both within and beyond the realm of commerce in the
United States.
It is important to note at the outset that U.S. trademark law governs
both the classic action of trademark infringement and the relatively
3. See Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 161, 171 (2004) ("The Patent-Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause [in the
U.S. Constitution] both authorize Congress to protect intellectual property.").
4. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (illustrating how a
copyright issue arose from plaintiff s parody of defendant's song lyrics).
5. See id. at 579 (explaining how parody both sheds light on an existing work and
creates something new).
6. See id. at 580 (defining a parody as mode of mimicry and re-creation of an original
work for the purpose of comic relief or ridicule).
7. See id. ("For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart
of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a
prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author's works.").
8. Id. at 580-81.
9. Id. at 580.
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"newer" action of trademark dilution.10 While parodies have recently
received some legislative attention in recent amendments to U.S. trademark
law through the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), the dividing
line between a "legitimate" parody and a "dilutive" parody is not entirely
clear, and the rather imprecise language of the TDRA has provoked an
interesting debate among trademark scholars and commentators." While
some commentators have. applauded the TDRA as having broadened the
protection of civil liberties through its "fair use" provision, 12 others have
argued that the TDRA takes freedom of expression too far by failing to
provide adequate protection against tarnishment caused by artistic works
that sully the reputation or good name of a famous trademark.1 3
This Article seeks to contribute to the existing debate by suggesting
that the TDRA's flawed treatment of parodies, quite ironically, stems from
the fact that it is alternatively too narrow in some respects and too broad in
others. The principal flaw in the TDRA's current parody clause lies in its
employment of the "trademark use" test for determining whether a parody
is "fair."1 4 In this respect, the parody provision in the TDRA is too lenient
vis-d-vis artistic parodies that are not used as trademarks and yet too strict
with respect to source-identifying parodies. In particular, it appears to
confer blanket immunity on all parodies that are not utilized as indicators
of source for goods or services, while imposing liability on all parodies that
function as trademarks, without enquiring satisfactorily into the nature or
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(c) (2006).
11. See generally Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006); Daniel R. Bereskin, Anti-
Dilution/Anti-Free-Riding Laws in the United States, Canada, and the EU: Bridges Too
Far?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1710 (2011); Justin J. Gunnell, Evaluation of the Dilution-
Parody Paradox in the Wake of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 26 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 441 (2008); Joel H. Steckel et al., Dilution Through the Looking Glass: A
Marketing Look at the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 616
(2006).
12. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out a
Luxury Claim and a Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 205, 205 (2007) (noting that
"[flor the first time in a while," trademark law in the United States has tilted the balance of
power "decisively against intellectual property owners"). Gerhardt observes that the TDRA
has recreated the concept of dilution as a "luxury claim available only to the most famous
marks" and "provides broader fair use defenses." Id. at 216.
13. See Alexandra E. Olson, Note, Dilution by Tarnishment: An Unworkable Cause of
Action in Cases of Artistic Expression, 53 B.C. L. REv. 693, 694-95, 719-20 (2012)
(suggesting that "First Amendment protection in the trademark dilution context has been
stretched too far" and "allows artists to escape liability at the expense of mark holders").
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
852012]
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impact of the parody in question.15 This Article argues that such a "black
and white" approach to parodies, based exclusively on the classification of
their status as either "non-trademark use" or "trademark use," is
insufficiently nuanced and fails to adequately assess the forms of harm that
ought to be targeted by a dilution statute.
To streamline and clarify the treatment of parodies under the Act, this
Article argues in favor of recognizing an independent defense for parodies
by separating the parody sub-clause from the current "fair use" provision in
the TDRA. Such a re-organization would liberate the parody defense from
the somewhat artificial constraints of the "trademark use" prohibition
imposed by the "fair use" provision. In this regard, the focus of the inquiry
should be on the effect that the parody has on the famous mark's distinctive
quality or reputation and not merely on the presence of "commercial" or
"trademark use." This Article concludes with some suggestions for reform,
including the articulation of a six-part test for assessing the legality of a
parody, in the hope that a more balanced and flexible parody defense in the
TDRA would lead to more enlightened and fairer trademark jurisprudence
in the United States.
Part I of this Article provides a historical overview of the TDRA and
the significant changes that it has made to the "dilution" landscape in the
United States. Part II explores the structure of the TDRA's "fair use"
provision and the impact of the "trademark use" exclusion on the parodies
sub-clause. Further, Part II argues that the parodies sub-clause provides
selective shelter, exonerating some parodies from liability while impugning
others, seemingly on the sole basis of "trademark use." Part II gives
separate attention to the TDRA's treatment of non-source-denoting
parodies (parodies that do not designate the origin of goods or services) and
source-denoting parodies (parodies that also function as trademarks to sell
goods or services). Part III formulates a number of proposals for reform
with the aim of introducing a sense of flexibility and nuance into the
TDRA's criteria of assessment for non-dilutive parodies.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT
The impact of the TDRA on trademark law in the United States can be
more fully appreciated in light of the legal developments accompanying the
historical evolution of dilution doctrine. Dilution, as a cause of action, can
be considered an "offshoot" of the older and more established trademark
15. See id. (allowing use of marks "other than as a designation of source").
86 [Vol. 35:83
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infringement action. 6 While the traditional trademark infringement action
governed by the federal Lanham Act in the United States targeted the
likelihood of consumer confusion arising from the unauthorized use of a
trademark by a junior user or competitor to sell goods or services," dilution
doctrine broadened the scope of protection afforded to trademarks by
recognizing (and proscribing) new forms of harm to trademark goodwill in
the modern marketplace.18 These harms include dilution by blurring (the
gradual whittling away of the distinctive character of a famous mark
through use on non-competing goods) 19 and dilution by tarnishment (harm
to a trademark's reputation through association with unsavory or
scandalous material).20 In this respect, the dilution movement, which is
often traced back to Frank I. Schechter,2 1 sought to expand the panoply of
exclusive rights enjoyed by trademark proprietors beyond the traditional
protection offered under classic trademark law by recognizing harm in
cases where consumer confusion is either absent or unlikely.22
Central to the Schechterian notion of dilution is the view that
trademarks no longer function solely as indicators of source and are, in
fact, magnets of commerce deserving of additional protection from the
increasingly deviant marketing practices of the modem marketplace. The
true value of a modern trademark, according to Schechter, lies in its ability
to communicate brand messages and to sell goods.24 Dilution doctrine
accordingly seeks to protect a trademark from the loss "or dispersion of
16. The period of history that accompanied the expansion of traditional trademark rules
to encompass dilution as a cause of action has sometimes been referred to as "the modem
era of trademark law." See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687, 1698-99 (1999).
17. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. The two conditions prescribed in the Lanham Act for
trademark infringement are "use in commerce" and "likely to cause confusion." Id.
§ 1114(1).
18. See Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 216-17, 222.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
20. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
21. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv.
813 (1927).
22. See Lemley, supra note 16, at 1698 (describing the shift in the nature of trademark
law away from the prevention of consumer confusion as a form of "doctrinal creep").
23. See Schechter, supra note 21, at 818. Due to these increasingly deviant practices of
psychological advertising, the modem trademark has, in Schecter's view, evolved from a
mere commercial symbol into "an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation of
goodwill." Id.
24. Id. at 819.
2012] 87
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[its] identity and hold upon" a public's consciousness 25 -forms of injury
that had not previously been recognized under the traditional ambit of the
Lanham Act.26
In the early years of its evolution, dilution doctrine in the United
States was governed largely by state legislation and case law. 27 The case of
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corp., in
which the plaintiffs objected to the use of the famous "Kodak" mark in
relation to bicycles, was one of the earliest attempts recognized and used by
courts in the United States to extend trademark protection to cases of
dilution.
The first federal attempt at legislation in the field of dilution law was
the U.S. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA). 29 However, the
text of the FTDA was not exactly "a model of clarity," resulting in some
rather confusing jurisprudence. 3 0 For example, it was not clear whether the
standard of proof required for a dilution action was evidence of actual
dilution or merely a likelihood of dilution.3' The general perception that
the law "[was] a mess" 32 was further compounded when the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. that the statute
required proof of actual dilution, 33 making it practically impossible to
successfully establish dilution in many ordinary cases where the activity
complained of was only potentially diluting.3 4 In 2006, Congress sought to
address some of the uncertainties in the FTDA through the passage of the
TDRA. 35  The TDRA is often credited with resolving some of the
ambiguities present in the FTDA by introducing statutory definitions for
25. Id. at 825.
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2006).
27. See Lemley, supra note 16, at 1698.
28. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corp., (1898) 15
R.P.C. 105 (Ch.) 106-07 (Eng.).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
30. Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 212.
31. Id. at 212-13 & n.44.
32. Id. at 213 (quoting Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 6 (2005) (testimony of Anne Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark
Association)) (alteration in original).
33. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
34. See Jonathan Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret: Whither Dilution under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 842, 844 (2003).
35. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
88 [Vol. 35:83
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"blurring" and "tarnishment," 36 clarifying the standard of proof required in
a dilution action, and broadening the fair use exceptions.
The TDRA contains an important change in language for permitted
uses of trademarks that are considered exceptions to dilution. Previously,
under the FTDA, parodies were not explicitly mentioned in the statute; as a
result, parodists often cited the "non-commercial use" exception.
However, the TDRA has amended the section on exclusions by introducing
three discrete categories to replace the earlier provision on non-commercial
use.4 0 The three categories are: "(A) [a]ny fair use," "(B) [a]ll forms of
news reporting and news commentary," and "(C) [a]ny non-commercial
use of a mark."4 1 While exceptions (B) and (C) are fairly straightforward,
the "fair use" defense in subsection (A) contains a number of subordinate
qualifying clauses and examples. 42 In particular, the notion of "fair use" in
subsection (A) encompasses uses of a famous mark that are of a descriptive
or nominative nature, "other than as a designation of source."4 3  This
significantly narrows the ambit of protection afforded to commercial
parodies that do function as a designation of source for the defendant's own
goods and services. The "fair use" subsection goes on to provide two
examples of what might be considered permitted use that does not
constitute trademark dilution, namely, "(i) advertising or [a] promotion that
permits consumers to compare goods or services" and "(ii) identifying and
parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the
goods or services of the famous mark owner." 44
It is interesting to note that parodies have been lumped together with
criticism and comparative advertising under the general category of "fair
use." 45 While this may seem logical at first glance, since parodies seek to
poke fun at or criticize an existing established mark, thereby inviting a
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
37. See id. (restoring the test for dilution to "likel[ihood]" of dilution rather than
"actual" dilution, effectively overruling Moseley). This has been applauded as a step in the
right direction, as "[c]laims for dilution make sense only if a remedy is available to rescue
the mark before actual dilution occurs." Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 213. In this regard,
Moseley might be considered a "wrong turn" in the law of dilution. Id. at 217.
38. Id. at 216.
39. Gunnell, supra note 11, at 462-63.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id
45. Id.
2012] 89
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comparison of sorts, parodies sometimes seek to convey a message that is
independent of the merits of the goods or services represented by the senior
mark. For example, in the case of an amusing mimicry, the target of a
parody's attempt at humor need not necessarily be the trademark from
which it is adapted, but rather the parody itself.4 6 In addition, the inclusion
in the TDRA of the phrase "other than as a designation of source" appears
to categorically exclude all parodies that also function as trademarks for
goods or services.47 The next section evaluates the structure of the "fair
use" parody provision through a discussion of the case law on parodies pre-
dating the TDRA, as well as recent jurisprudence that has emerged in the
wake of the TDRA.
II. NOT ALL PARODIES ARE CREATED EQUAL: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE
"FAIR USE" EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE TDRA
While the exceptions to dilution laid out in the TDRA were designed
to introduce a sense of balance to the Act, the reworked "fair use" defense
has come under fire for providing excessively broad immunity to certain
types of parodies and other expressive uses of trademarks.4 8 The "fair use"
defense in the TDRA differs from its predecessor in that it contains
exemptions for nominative and descriptive uses of a trademark "other than
as a designation of source," including uses for the purposes of parody and
comparative advertising. 49 A plain reading of this provision suggests that
the "fair use" exception provides blanket immunity to all parodies as long
as they are not being used as trademarks to designate the origin of goods or
services.o Unfortunately, the Act does not provide a definition of
"parody," and the somewhat expansive language of the new "fair dealing"
provision has created interpretive difficulties for both parodists and
trademark proprietors.
At the heart of this interpretive debacle lies the question: "Is it ever
possible for a non-source-denoting parody to dilute a trademark?" The
46. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252,
256 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that defendants sold chew toys in the shapes of handbags
and other accessories under the label "Chewy Vuiton"). The message being communicated
here was not necessarily a negative portrayal of the plaintiffs' "Louis Vuitton"-branded
luxury goods. The defendants' intention could very well have been to adapt and transform
the mark into an amusing form for use in a different context.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
48. Olson, supra note 13, at 718-28.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
50. See id.
90 [Vol. 35:83
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most obvious form of harm that comes to mind (where non-source-
denoting parodies are concerned) is dilution by tarnishment, which is
specifically included as a cause of action in the TDRA. Since parodies,
by their nature, are expressive, they may be presented to the public as
"works of art" without being connected to any goods or services and, in
some cases, without the expectation of commercial gain.5 2 Questions of
fairness arise, however, if the comparison that is being made by the parody
is scandalous, shocking, or in bad taste, thereby denigrating the reputation
of the mark that is being ridiculed. Given the broad language of the parody
exception in the TDRA, it would appear that all such tarnishing uses
would, in a single stroke, be exempted from liability, as long as the parody
in question is not being utilized as an indicator of source.
A related question is whether a parody that does function as an
indicator of source is automatically excluded from protection under the
"fair use" provision. This is an important question because the TDRA
stipulates that only parodies that do not function as designators of source
are eligible for exemption under the "fair use" provision.53  However,
might such a source-denoting parody be eligible for protection under some
other provision of the Act? The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has answered this question in the affirmative, upholding as a
successful parody an amusing mimicry of the famous Louis Vuitton brand,
"Chewy Vuiton," used as a mark to sell chew toys for dogs.5 4  This
decision, discussed below, opens the door for other source-denoting
parodies to be immunized from liability under the main dilution factors of
the Act, rather than under its "fair use" exception. The parody clause in the
"fair use" provision is, therefore, according to the Louis Vuitton Malletier
SA. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC decision, not exhaustive in its coverage of
51. Id. § 1125(c)(1).
52. Interestingly, unlike the TDRA, U.S. copyright law appears to provide clearer
guidance in ascertaining what constitutes unfair copying for the purpose of parody or satire.
In the case of Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in determining whether a copied work qualifies as a
parody or satire under the first factor of the "fair use defense," 17 U.S.C. § 107, copying
done for commercial or profit-making purposes is presumptively unfair. Under U.S.
copyright law, there would therefore be a presumption of unfairness operating against a
parodist who copies a work for commercial purposes, but not against another who does so
for purely artistic or expressive reasons.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
54. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256 (4th
Cir. 2007). Louis Vuitton was not the only famous mark parodied by the defendant. Id. at
258. It also marketed and sold other merchandise for dogs under "parody marks" such as
"Chewnel No. 5," "Dog Perignonn," and "Sniffany & Co." Id.
2012] 91
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non-dilutive parodies.55 It may be possible for a parodist to avoid liability
under the TDRA even if the parody also doubles up as a source-denoting
trademark for goods or services." However, the "non-comprehensive"
coverage of the parody exception in the TDRA may generate some
interpretive uncertainty in the absence of a clearer elucidation of the
relationship between the dilution factors and the "fair use" defense.
In summary, the concern with the TDRA's "fair use" parody clause is
twofold. First, it is too broad in some respects by immunizing all non-
source-denoting parodies from liability in one fell swoop. The main
criticism of such a broad-brush approach is that it fails to assess the
message communicated by the parody and its effect on the reputation of the
mark. Second, the clause is, quite ironically, too narrow in other respects,
as it excludes from its ambit certain source-denoting parodies that might be
deserving of protection. The following Parts analyze both of these
concerns separately in order to lay the groundwork for the proposals for
reform developed later in this Article.
A. Non-Source-Denoting Parodies: Are All of Them Equally Deserving of
Immunity under the TDRA?
This Part discusses the extent to which the TDRA's "fair use"
provision fails to distinguish adequately between parodies that convey an
artistic or social message and those that tarnish the senior mark.
The two branches of dilution doctrine-blurring and tarnishment-are
predicated on two different forms of injury.57 While dilution by blurring
focuses primarily on the economic harm caused to a trademark resulting
from its loss of distinctiveness, dilution by tarnishment is based on the
damage to reputation arising from its association with unsavory material. 8
The current language of the TDRA's "fair use" provision appears to
implicitly divide parodies into two distinct groups-those that function as
source identifiers and those that do not. Source-denoting parodies are
categorically excluded from the ambit of protection under the "fair use"
55. Id. at 266-67.
5 6. Id.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (requiring that petitioner show an "inten[t] to trade on
the recognition of the famous mark" under dilution by blurring and an "inten[t] to harm the
reputation of the famous mark" under dilution by tamishment).
58. See id.
92 [Vol. 35:83
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provision,5 9 while non-source denoting parodies appear to receive
automatic immunity. This inflexible, black or white approach to parodies
eviscerates the "dilution by tamishment" action, effectively stripping
trademark owners of the right to obtain an appropriate remedy against
parodists who have tarnished their marks by engaging in an unfair or
offensive comparison.
As an example of an artistic parody that, in her opinion, goes too far,
commentator Alexandra Olson cites a large poster by artist Max Papeschi
exhibited at a local Polish museum in 2010 as part of a larger series which
60juxtaposed iconic cartoon characters with images of destruction.
Papeschi's work featured a naked woman with a swastika and an image of
Mickey Mouse, and this controversial montage created a furor in Poland at
the time.6 1 The juxtaposition of Disney's beloved and world renowned
icon next to a nude figure and a Nazi symbol would arguably tarnish
Mickey Mouse's warm, lovable image and denigrate this paragon of good
clean family entertainment. As Olson observes, Papeschi's use of the
Mickey Mouse image in an artistic work is not a designation of source, as
the Disney character is not being used to designate the origin of goods and
services.62 Such a use would therefore be exonerated from liability under
the "fair use" provision, notwithstanding the sullying effect it is likely to
have on the famous mark's reputation.
A related criticism that may be leveled at the current parody provision
is that it does not possess sufficient nuance to assess the type and extent of
damage caused by the tarnishing effect of a non-source-denoting parody.
In particular, it does not provide guidance on the level and quality of
ridicule that is considered "acceptable" for a parody. Pre-TDRA
jurisprudence has, for example, demonstrated an interesting bias against
sexual parodies, while showing favor for "good, clean" humor.63  It is
therefore uncertain whether a sexual parody, which would have been
considered tarnishing under the FTDA, would enjoy immunity under the
somewhat broader "fair use" provision of the TDRA. If the plain language
of the Act were followed, such an interpretation might mean that a string of
59. It is important to note, however, that source-denoting parodies may be exonerated
on other grounds, such as non-satisfaction of the dilution by blurring criteria, as seen in
Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 265-68.
60. Olson, supra note 13, at 693.
6 1. Id.
62. Id. at 719-20.
63. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17722, at *40 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (concluding that the sexual nature of
defendants' parody could "injure the business reputation of the plaintiff').
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legal authority pre-dating the enactment of the TDRA would no longer be
good law in the United States.
The case of Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc. provides a
good illustration of a pre-TDRA case that concerned a lewd or obscene
parody.64 In that case, the plaintiffs trademarked characters were depicted
by the defendant in various sexual acts. 5 In considering the plaintiffs
claim for dilution, one of the key tests applied by the court was whether the
contested use was likely to injure the famous trademark's commercial
66
reputation.66 The court correctly found that the defendant's use created a
likelihood of dilution under Georgia's anti-dilution statute,67 but it remains
an open question as to whether the defendant's use would be exonerated
today under the broader "fair use" defense of the TDRA. Given that the
defendant's depiction of the plaintiffs trademarked characters in sexual
acts can be considered use "other than as a trademark," there is at least an
arguable case that the parody may be protected as a form of "fair use"
under the TDRA.
There are other categories of parody that would be exempt from
liability under the TDRA's "fair use" provision. One commentator, Justin
Gunnell, has suggested that parodies in general can be divided into five
categories:68 (1) non-commercial and hybrid expression parodies (such as
an artistic display of nude Barbie dolls being attacked by kitchen
appliances);6 9 (2) source identification parodies (such as Ballooningdales
for party decorating services 70 or Gucci Gucci Goo for handcrafted baby
gifts);7 1 (3) parodies that use trademarks as a medium (such as a satire
which pokes fun at the taste of a famous brand of beer); 72 (4) lewd, illicit or
unclean parodies (such as the depiction of famous trademarked characters
64. Id.
65. Id. at *1.
66. Id. at *40-41.
67. Id.
68. Gunnell, supra note 11, at 454.
69. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
70. BALLOONINGDALES OF WESTCARE, http://ballooningdales.net/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012).
71. Gucci Gucci Goo, http://gucciguccigoogifts.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
72. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1994)
(describing defendant's use of the plaintiffs slogan to bring awareness to the implications
of oil spills). The defendant replaced the plaintiffs famous slogan, "ONE TASTE AND
YOU'LL DRINK IT DRY" with "ONE TASTE AND YOU'LL DRINK IT OILY." Id.
The new slogan was accompanied by an image of thick oil emanating from a can of the
plaintiffs beer and flowing onto the plaintiffs trademark eagle, which was portrayed as
saying, "Yuck!" Id.
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having sex);73 and (5) pure commercial parodies (the use of an altered
version of a senior mark on a junior user's product for humorous effect).7 4
There is some overlap between the categories identified by Gunnell,
particularly source identification parodies and pure commercial parodies.
Of these five categories, categories (1), (3), and (4) would automatically
receive exemption under the parodies sub-clause of the TDRA, regardless
of the nature and type of injury inflicted on the senior mark.75 This raises
serious concerns for the availability of the dilution by tarnishment action,
since practically every case of non-trademark expressive use would receive
protection under the Act.
Although preserving freedom of speech is an important priority for
trademark law, the TDRA arguably tilts the balance too far in favor of
"non-trademark use" parodies. A literal interpretation of the "fair use"
provision in the TDRA would obliterate the line of authority in the United
States that distinguishes between "clean" and "obscene" parodies.7 6 Since
many obscene parodies do not function as trademarks in and of themselves,
they would, by definition, receive protection under the TDRA's current
defense for parodies.n Such an interpretation would mean that sexual
parodies, previously considered tarnishing under the pre-TDRA legal
framework, would now be immune from liability under the broader
parodies defense.
73. Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17722, *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).
74. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994) (depicting
plaintiff's deer logo running away from defendant's lawn tractor and barking dog).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006).
76. Several cases decided prior to the enactment of the TDRA provide useful guidance
on the extent to which "unclean" or offensive images may affect the legality of a parody.
See, e.g., Pillsbury, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722, at *40-41 (holding that the depiction by
defendants of plaintiffs trade characters in sexual acts was likely to cause injury to the
commercial reputation and distinctive quality of the plaintiffs trademarks); Jordache
Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
"Lardashe," a brand of jeans targeted at heavy set women and represented by a pig logo,
was a successful parody of "Jordache" because it was unlikely to generate negative or
unwholesome connections with the famous trademark); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.
v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming district court's
finding that defendant's use of plaintiffs trademark in the pornographic film "Debbie Does
Dallas" would engender confusion resulting in irreparable harm to plaintiff were defendants
not enjoined from its distribution and exhibition); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that defendant's use of the phrase
"Enjoy Cocaine" on posters was likely to tarnish the reputation of the plaintiffs famous
Coca-Cola trademark).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
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While it is not the contention of this Article that only clean parodies
that are "in good taste" ought to be protected, it is important that the
statutory defense for parodies provides a sufficiently flexible framework
for judges to consider the nature and quality of harm inflicted by the junior
user on the famous mark. A relevant counter-argument that may be raised
at this juncture is that judges are not necessarily in the best position to
determine whether a parody is "in good taste" and that "clean" parodies are
not always more deserving of protection than lewd or offensive parodies.
However, to determine what is "deserving" of protection is not simply a
question of classifying a parody as either "source-denoting" or "non-
source-denoting." To answer this question adequately requires an inquiry
into the type of message that the parody is seeking to convey-an inquiry
which the current, rigid formulation of the TDRA does not appear to
accommodate.
B. Source-Denoting Parodies: Does the TDRA Confer Adequate
Protection?
Interestingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held in the oft-cited Louis Vuitton case that a parody which was being used
as a trademark to sell goods in commerce could, in some circumstances, be
exempted from liability for dilution, even though such use would not be
covered by the "fair use" defense under the TDRA." As such, the parody
in question would have to be "justified" or exonerated as an acceptable
form of use under some other provision in the Act, and the court's ruling is
therefore interesting in that it reveals the non-exhaustive ambit of the "fair
use" parody defense. The plaintiff in that case was Louis Vuitton, a
manufacturer of luxury handbags, luggage, and accessories, which had
taken legal action against a Nevada company that made chew toys for dogs
in the shape of handbags to mimic the plaintiffs famous products. 7 9 The
court denied the plaintiffs claim for trademark dilution on the ground that
the defendant's chew toys were a successful parody of the plaintiffs
famous mark.80 However, since the defendant was using the parody as its
own designation of source (for chew toys), the parody provision in the "fair
use" defense did not apply.8 ' The court exonerated the defendant's use of
"Chewy Vuiton" at the prima facie stage of the dilution analysis, holding
78. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268-69
(4th Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 256.
80. Id. at 267-68.
81. Id. at 266.
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that the parody in question did not meet the six criteria for dilution by
blurring. 82 In addition, there was insufficient evidence of a choking hazard
(which the plaintiff claimed the chew toys posed), in the court's opinion, to
found a claim for tarnishment." The court's analysis provides a strong
indication that other factors may operate to exonerate a parody, even if it is
being used qua trademark to designate, in commerce, the origin of goods
84
or services.
The court's analysis in Louis Vuitton indicates that a parody does not
necessarily need to satisfy the "fair use" provision in the TDRA in order to
be exonerated from liability. Before the "fair use" provision is even
invoked, the plaintiff's claim may fail on the basis that the elements of the
principal cause of action (dilution) are not satisfied. In its critique of the
District Court's ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that the six criteria for dilution by blurring under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(B) need to be adequately discussed in order to assess whether
the plaintiffs claim succeeds on the merits at the preliminary, prima facie
level. The six factors are:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an
association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.86
The six factors for dilution by blurring arguably serve as a preliminary
"filter" to ensure that only forms of use that are likely to cause loss of
distinctiveness to a famous mark will trigger prima facie liability under the
Act. An allegedly diluting use which does not satisfy these threshold
requirements will be exonerated, and the claim for dilution denied, without
the need to engage in an inquiry as to whether the use is "fair." Hence,
82. Id. at 268.
83. Id. at 268-69.
84. See id. at 268 (taking into account that defendant "intentionally associated its
marks" but did so "only partially and ... imperfectly, so as to convey the simultaneous
message that it was not in fact a source of [plaintiff's] products").
85. Id. at 266.
86. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)).
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these criteria serve as a safety net to ensure that only at least arguable cases
of dilution filter through for analysis under the "defense" stage of the
inquiry. In this light, one might argue that the "fair use" defense, as it
stands, need not be broadened to include deserving source-denoting
parodies, since these are already likely to be exonerated under the six-
factor test for dilution. This built-in system of checks and balances helps to
ensure that deserving parodies which do not qualify under "fair use" will
still be exempted under the Act.
At first glance, it might seem that the dilution factors enumerated in
Section 2 of the TDRA render the parody sub-clause in the "fair use"
provision unnecessary. 87 An argument might be made that since
"deserving parodies" are already going to be saved under the preliminary
test for dilution, there is no need for a separate exemption for parodies at
the defense stage of the analysis. Bearing in mind that the six dilution
factors apply both to blurring and tarnishment, non-dilutive parodies
would, by definition, be exonerated from liability at the preliminary stage
of the dilution analysis, thereby resulting in the parody sub-clause in the
TDRA becoming otiose or nugatory.
Yet, a closer examination of Section 2 reveals some interesting
features of the dilution factors. Although these factors have been drafted as
being applicable to both dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment,
they seem to be more compatible with an assessment of dilution by
blurring. While all the dilution factors in Section 2 are admittedly
capable of application to both forms of dilution, criteria such as "[t]he
extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark," 89 and "[w]hether the user of the mark or trade
name intended to create an association with the famous mark,"90 seek to
measure the impact of the allegedly diluting activity on the distinctive
quality of the famous mark, along with its capacity to serve as a unique
identifier of the provenance of goods and services. These are primarily
concerns relating to blurring, although a connection or mental association
is, of course, also required for a claim for tarnishment. 9' However, the
dilution factors do not specifically target the harms, such as the impact on
the famous mark's reputation, that are most strongly associated with
tarnishment. It is therefore not implausible that a court might see the need
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006) (listing the dilution factors).
88. See Bereskin, supra note 11, at 1725.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii).
90. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v).
91. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
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for a separate parody provision that would serve as a "fail-safe mechanism"
for deserving parodies, particularly those of a non-commercial nature, that
slip through the "cracks" of the dilution factors.
The approach adopted by the court in Louis Vuitton would therefore
imply the recognition of a two-tiered system for exonerating parodies under
the TDRA.92 At one level, there is an implied "safety net" for deserving
source-denoting parodies under the six factors for dilution by blurring. At
another level, there is the explicit "fair use" defense for non-source-
denoting parodies. While such a bifurcated approach might be defended on
the ground that deserving parodies would receive protection (and therefore
be exonerated from liability) in the final analysis, it runs the risk of creating
interpretive uncertainties for judges seeking to rely on the plain language of
the parody provision. An argument might be made that the parody
provision should be redrafted so that it encompasses all forms of legitimate
parodies and provides clearer guidance on the dividing line between
acceptable and unfair comparisons.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Given the interpretive uncertainties discussed in the preceding Part,
this portion of the Article argues in favor of adopting a more systematic
framework for the protection of parodies under the TDRA. As a
preliminary matter, the Act should include a definition of the term
"parody" so as to draw a clearer distinction between use of a mark for the
purpose of entertainment or satire and other expressive uses of a mark. In
addition, the scope of liability for non-source-denoting parodies and
source-denoting parodies should be governed by a single provision that is
independent of the existing "fair use" defense. This would help to
streamline the legislative approach toward acceptable parodies and provide
greater interpretive clarity and guidance for judges deciding dilution claims
involving parodies.
Commentator Olson's response to the perceived "rigidity" of the
TDRA's "fair use" defense (and its consequent failure to provide trademark
owners with adequate protection against tarnishment caused by artistic
works) is to replace the existing formulation with a multi-factorial test
similar to that for fair use in copyright law.93 Trademark infringement's
92. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266-68
(4th Cir. 2007) (utilizing both the "fair use" provision and the dilution factors separately to
reach a conclusion).
93. Olson, supra note 13, at 729.
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"artistic relevance" test could, in Olson's view, also be applied
productively to the context of trademark parodies in determining whether
the artistic use in question is "fair." 94 Formulated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, the artistic
relevance test provides that the Lanham Act will not apply to artistic works
unless "the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression."95 A Grimaldi test that is adapted for the
dilution context would therefore entail a balancing exercise between the
interest of protecting the reputations of famous marks and the public
interest of free expression.
There is indeed some degree of overlap between copyright and
trademark law in the protection of adapted artistic works, and a multi-
factorial test (borrowed from copyright law) for parodies would introduce
an element of much-needed flexibility to the current rigid framework of the
TDRA's "fair use" defense. However, there are also important distinctions
between copyright and trademark law that militate against a wholesale
importation of the copyright fair use test into the TDRA. Dilution by
tarnishment, as a cause of action, has a different focus from copyright
infringement. 9 6 Dilution by tarnishment seeks to target uses-artistic or
otherwise-that have a damaging effect on a famous mark's reputation,
thereby ultimately weakening its ability to attract customers and revenue,
even in the absence of consumer confusion in the marketplace. 9 7  In
contrast, copyright law focuses primarily on protecting the work from
unauthorized reproduction, and is not chiefly concerned with the impact of
the work's function (assuming that it is also being used as a trademark) as
an indicator of source for goods and services. 98  It is therefore the
contention of this Article that the test for a "fair" parody needs to
specifically address the factors that relate directly to the impact of a parody
on the trademark's key function of attracting consumers in the relevant
marketplace. A multi-factorial test which is divorced from a trademark's
key function of selling goods in the marketplace would not adequately
target the types of harm that dilution by tarnishment is designed to address.
On the other hand, the considerations formulated by the Grimaldi court in
94. Id. at 709-11.
95. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(2)(C) (2006) (defining dilution by tarnishment), with
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (describing the copyright owner's exclusive rights).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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its artistic relevance test for trademark infringement 99 can be fruitfully
incorporated into an analytic framework for determining the legality of an
artistic parody.
The proposals discussed in the following paragraphs seek to
consolidate the legislative protection for parodies into a single, integrated
provision under the TDRA that is independent of the current "fair use"
defense. The reworked provision prescribes a six-part test for determining
whether a parody ought to be exempt from liability for dilution under the
TDRA, in lieu of the rigid "trademark use" test in the current formulation.
This Part also argues in favor of preserving much of the pre-TDRA dilution
jurisprudence, which casts valuable light on the factors that should guide a
court's discretion in assessing whether a parody is dilutive. Insisting on the
current, rigid formulation of the TDRA's parody clause would have the
unfortunate effect of obliterating much of the pre-2006 case law on
parodies, which has been built up painstakingly over the years. oo
A. Incorporating a Definition of "Parody" in the TDRA
Although the term "parody" might be understood by many users of the
English language as referring to an amusing or entertaining adaptation or
mimicry of an original work or product, formulating an appropriate
definition of "parody" for trademark law is not an easy task. This is
primarily because parodies can be commercial, partly commercial, or non-
commercial, and may or may not harness the source-denoting features of a
trademark.'01 Some parodies which are used to market goods or services
may even result in consumer confusion in the marketplace, particularly if
the parody is not clearly distinguished from the senior mark. For example,
the use of the mark "Bloomingdales" by a junior trader to market flowers
(or "blooms") as a humorous play on words may constitute classic
trademark infringement if it generates uncertainty among consumers as to
the source of the products.10 2 A definition of parody ought therefore to
99. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999-1000.
100. See Gunnell, supra note 11, at 463 (observing that a significant number of existing
cases on dilution, including Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir.
1994), Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994), and Conopco, Inc. v.
3DO Co., No. 99 CV 10893(JSM), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20510 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999),
would have to be reversed in favor of the parodist if they were decided under the TDRA).
101. See Gunnell, supra note 11, at 454.
102. The likelihood of confusion in this scenario would arise from the use by the junior
trader of an identical trademark to market what might quite possibly be directly competing
goods (taking into account the wide range of goods available for purchase at a large
department store like Bloomingdales). However, in determining whether the use in question
2012] 101
19
Lim: Of Chew Toys and Designer Handbags: A Critical Analysis of the “P
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
prescribe the requirements of what constitutes an acceptable adaptation of
an existing mark for the purpose of entertainment or amusement.
While some judicial decisions have suggested that a parody should
render the style of the original work "ridiculous,"10 3 the element of ridicule
need not necessarily be a requirement of a successful parody. Yet, it is
interesting to observe the extent to which "ridicule" is considered a central
element of a successful parody. In the case of Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P.
v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., for instance, a parody is defined as a "literary
or artistic work that broadly mimics an author's characteristic style and
holds it up to ridicule."10 4 Parodies can sometimes create a favorable image
of the mimicked work by highlighting elements that might be construed as
amusing or humorous, without necessarily casting the original work in a
negative light. As such, the definition of a parody cited with approval by
the court in New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc. can
perhaps be considered more appropriate and inclusive: "a work in which
the language or style of another work is closely imitated or mimicked for
comic effect or ridicule."o The element of "comic effect" in this latter
definition recognizes the possibility that a parody's main object could be to
entertain the public through a humorous comparison or adaptation and not
necessarily to denigrate the famous mark.106
However, the mere fact of "closely imitat[ing] or mimick[ing] for
comic effect or ridicule"' 07 is not sufficient to grant exemption from
liability. It is also necessary to consider the impact that such imitation or
mimicry has on the public's impression of the senior mark. 08 This Section
argues in favor of adopting a cumulative, six-part test for determining
whether a parody is dilutive, so as to guide the exercise of judicial
discretion in carving out the boundary between fair expression and dilution.
While the ultimate weight to be given to each factor is ultimately a matter
of judicial discretion, each of these six factors should play a role in
is confusing to the average consumer, the color, font, appearance, style and other aesthetic
embellishments used by the junior trader in presenting the word "Bloomingdales" to its
customers would also be relevant considerations.
103. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997).
104. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Grp., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1525
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods.,
Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1527-28.
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determining the legal legitimacy of a parody, which should be assessed
flexibly on the basis of its overall effect on the famous mark, rather than on
the sole basis of "trademark use" or the lack thereof.
1. What is the purpose or function of the parody (e.g., for satire,
entertainment and/or social commentary)?
Ascertaining the purpose or function of the parody is an integral step
in determining whether it constitutes a legally permissible form of
expression. Parodies that convey a satirical message for the entertainment
of the masses, or a message of social or cultural significance,' 09 are forms
of expression that arguably deserve protection in a free and democratic
society. In the case of Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Products, for
example, the defendants depicted naked Barbie dolls in a display being
attacked by kitchen appliances." 0 While the subject matter of the display
might seem salacious at first glance, the plaintiff s claim for dilution under
the FTDA was unsuccessful in this case because the defendants were using
the display to protest the objectification of women associated with the
Barbie brand."' The social message being conveyed by the defendants
qualified as a form of expression protected under the FTDA's "non-
commercial" use exception, even though the defendants' parody generated
more than $3,000 in sales.112  This case suggests that a parody whose
primary goal is to convey a social or political message may be treated as
non-commercial even though it generates some revenue for the parodist.
Such an approach, which focuses on the primary objective of the parody,
rather than on whether it is "revenue generating," should be incorporated
into the test for parodies in a re-worked TDRA.
An interesting case from Canada provides another illustration of how
the transformative adaptation of an existing trademark can qualify as a
successful parody that seeks to convey a message of social importance.
The case of Compagnie Gindrale des tablissements Michelin-Michelin &
Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General
109. Interestingly, the concept of "cultural parodies" has taken root in Chinese society,
where grassroots communities create programs to poke fun at authoritative cultural events
such as the National Spring Gala and the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay. Haochen Sun, Can
Louis Vuitton Dance with HiPhone? Rethinking the Idea of Social Justice in Intellectual
Property Law, 15 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 389, 398 (2012). The interest in cultural
parodies has extended to hugely popular Hollywood movies, with parodists in China
producing "shanzhai movies" to mimic blockbuster films from the United States. Id.
110. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. Id. at 796, 812.
112. Gunnell, supra note 11, at 456.
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Workers Union of Canada involved a labor union embroiled in a dispute
with an employer.' 13 The union distributed leaflets to the public depicting
the employer's famous trademarked Bibendum character about to step on a
hapless worker. 114 This depiction of the employer's trademarked character
engaging in an act of supposed "exploitation" was designed to highlight the
labor-related grievances that the union had with the employer and to
convey information about what the union perceived were unfair working
conditions."' 5  The court held that the leaflets did not depreciate the
goodwill in the employer's mark under Section 22 of the Canadian
legislation,1 6 paying particular attention to the primary purpose of the
defendant's use, which was to convey information of some social
importance to the public."' 7 If this case were to be decided in the United
States, it should also receive protection under the TDRA, as it is a form of
"non-trademark use"-the adaptation of the Bibendum character served to
communicate information and not to sell goods in competition with the
famous mark holder. However, the test for whether it constitutes a
successful parody should depend, among other factors, on whether it seeks
to engage in social commentary or to communicate a message, and not
solely on whether the parody is being used as a trademark.
Notwithstanding the above, an adaptation of a famous mark should not
be treated as a "parody" simply because it conveys information of some
kind. The social utility (including for the purpose of entertainment) of the
information communicated should be taken into account when deciding
whether an adaptation is potentially damaging to the distinctive quality or
repute of a famous mark. For example, the gratuitous association of a
famous mark with pornographic material" 8 or the use of a famous mark in
contexts involving arbitrary violence, bloodshed, and gore are not forms of
expression that ought to be countenanced under a reworked TDRA. "9 In
113. Compagnie G6ndrale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. Nat'1 Auto.,
Aerospace, Transp. & Gen. Workers Union of Can., [1997] 2 F.C. 306, 307 (Can. B.C. Trial
Div.).
114. Id. at 318.
115. Id.
116. See Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 § 22 (Can.).
117. Michelin, 2 F.C. at 341.
118. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17722, at *41 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (holding that an advertisement in Screw
Magazine, which depicted the plaintiffs characters "Poppin' Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh" in
sexual acts, amounted to dilution).
119. In Conopco, Inc. v. 3DO Co., No. 99 CV 10893(JSM), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20510, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999), the plaintiffs' trademark character "Snuggle The
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this regard, the first part of the test in a reworked TDRA provision would
preserve and embrace much of the earlier dilution jurisprudence under the
FTDA and would not regard artistic expression in a parody as conferring
blanket immunity against liability for dilution.
2. Does the parody damage the reputation or distinctive quality of
the famous mark withoutjustification?
This second criterion focuses on the impact of the parody on
consumers' perception of the senior mark. Including a consideration based
on "damage to reputation" would address the concern that the current
TDRA fails to adequately protect famous marks against parodies that cause
dilution by tarnishment. However, damage to reputation is only one factor
in the analysis-it is necessary to consider whether the parody's expressed
statement is justified in the circumstances. A parody that damages the
reputation of the famous mark may still be upheld as fair and reasonable if
it conveys information of social importance about the mark's owner, such
as unethical trading practices, or environmentally unfriendly operations.
However, in order to succeed, the parodist would have to demonstrate a
necessary connection between the negative statement or portrayal and the
famous mark.
The "necessity" test formulated by the court in the pre-TDRA case of
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications is instructive in determining
whether a parody's statement about the famous mark owner is justified. 12 0
In Anheuser-Busch, the defendant's parody depicted thick oil (instead of
beer) flowing from one of the plaintiffs beer cans onto the plaintiffs
trademarked eagle logo. 121  The eagle was drenched with oil and was
depicted as saying "Yuck!" in the advertisement. 12 Although the
defendant's parody sought to highlight the environmental horrors of the
Gasconade oil spill on nature and wildlife and to poke fun at Anheuser-
Busch for continuing to use water out of the Gasconade River after the
spill, the court found that the defendant's portrayal of the plaintiffs
products as being filled with oil violated both federal trademark law and
Bear," which appeared in advertisements for fabric softener, was set on fire in a commercial
for a video game "BattleTanx: Global Assault" created by the defendants. The court rejected
the defendants' argument that the commercial was designed to parody the plaintiffs'
trademark. Id. at *6-8.
120. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 772.
122. Id.
2012] 105
23
Lim: Of Chew Toys and Designer Handbags: A Critical Analysis of the “P
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW
Missouri's anti-dilution statute.1 23 The "necessity" test for social criticism
or commentary accordingly mandates the establishment of a rational or
logical connection between the statement and the famous mark, which the
parodist failed to demonstrate in this case.124
In a similar vein, the "necessity test" was applied in Dr. Seuss
Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. to denounce a parodist's
mimicry of Dr. Seuss's "The Cat in the Hat" as unwarranted. 125 Styled in
the same lyrical pattern as Dr. Seuss's original work, the parodist created a
poem depicting elements from the O.J. Simpson trial for murder.12 6 Instead
of "One fish / two fish / red fish / blue fish," the parody contained verses
such as "One knife? / Two knife? / Red knife / Dead wife."' 27 As in
Anheuser-Busch, the parodist in Dr. Seuss Enterprises was engaging in
social or political commentary that was unrelated to the plaintiffs
trademark or business activities, and such commentary was potentially
damaging to the plaintiffs reputation without an appropriate justification.
Therefore, the introduction of a "necessity test" into the framework for
assessing parodies under the TDRA would imbue the Act with much-
needed flexibility and nuance. In particular, the closeness or strength of the
connection between the parodist's expressed message and the criticized
trademark would be a much more salient test for the legitimacy of the
claimed parody instead of relying, as the current formulation does, on rigid
factors such as the presence or absence of "trademark use."
3. Is the parody being used as an indicator of source or quality for
goods or services that either dilutes the famous mark or generates
a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace?
Another factor that ought to be taken into account is whether the
parody itself serves as a trademark for the defendant's goods or services.
The presence of "trademark use" in a parody, though unfavorable to the
parodist, should not automatically lead to liability for dilution. "Trademark
use," like the earlier factors, is but one consideration in deciding whether a
parody is fair. It may be possible for a parody to be used as a trademark
123. Id. at 776-78.
124. See id. at 777 (finding that defendant's parody, without disclaimer, was too similar
to plaintiff's famous marks).
125. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399-1400
(9th Cir. 1997).
126. Id. at 1396.
127. Id. at 1401.
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and yet survive the analysis under a reworked TDRA if there are other
sufficiently pressing reasons for exempting it from liability.
Examples of trademarks that arguably also succeed as parodies would
include some of the brands discussed earlier, such as Chewy Vuiton (as a
parody of Louis Vuitton),128  Ballooningdales (as a parody of
Bloomingdales),12 9 and Gucci Gucci Goo (as a parody of the famous Gucci
brand).130 One element that these successful parodies have in common is
that they are sufficiently different from the famous marks on which they are
"modeled" to stand as indicators of source in their own right without
causing economic harm or reputational harm to the more established
trademark proprietors.13' There is arguably no real issue of any confusion
or even connection, in the mind of the average consumer, between the
owners of the brand Gucci Gucci Goo and those of the Gucci brand. While
the consumer might recognize that the junior mark contains a play on
words derived in part from the senior mark, the clear morphological
distinction between the two brands militates against any finding of dilution
or confusion in the marketplace. Apart from differences in morphology,
factors such as artistic embellishments, fanciful script, colors, and other
visual elements may play a role in helping to distinguish between the
parody mark and the famous mark. In addition, the difference in the field
of activity or types of goods sold by the junior and senior traders is a
relevant consideration. One might say, for instance, that the dog toys sold
by the manufacturers of Chewy Vuiton and the luxury goods sold by Louis
Vuitton are as different as "chalk and cheese." 32
In this regard, it is important to note that trademark law, whether in its
original, classical form or in the guise of anti-dilution doctrine, does not
confer a right on a trademark proprietor to prevent modifications or
adaptations of their trade symbols by other traders in non-confusing or
128. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256 (4th
Cir. 2007).
129. BALLOONINGDALES OF WESTCARE, supra note 70.
130. Gucci Gucci Goo, supra note 71.
131. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 260 (recognizing that defendant's mark
"conjures up" plaintiffs famous mark, but, "at the same time, it communicates that it is not
the [Louis Vuitton] product").
132. The phrase "as different as chalk and cheese" was used by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltie, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824, para.
31 (Can.), to highlight the significant difference between luxury champagne and mid-priced
women's wear.
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non-diluting ways.' 33 The classical action of trademark infringement only
targets confusing uses of a trade symbol, usually within the same field of
activity.13 4 Hence, the use of the confusingly similar variant "Koodak"
(with an additional 'o') to sell film in direct competition with the "Kodak"
brand would likely be considered an example of trademark infringement.
On the other hand, dilution, particularly dilution by blurring, targets non-
competing uses of a famous mark that reduce its distinctive quality, even in
the absence of consumer confusion.13 5 An oft-cited example of dilution is
the use of "Kodak" on unrelated goods such as bicycles.' 3 6 In this case, the
unauthorized use does not constitute a "play of words" or a "witty
modification" of the original mark, but contains the exact same lettering as
the original mark. The extent to which an alleged parody has been
transformed from the original famous mark is, accordingly, an important
factor that should be given considerable weight because the degree of
transformation is likely to affect the consuming public's perception of the
parody as a badge of origin for goods or services.
While transformative use of a trademark is one factor that favors a
successful parody, transformative use, on its own, should not provide a
parodist with immunity from dilution. An interesting example of how a
witty or humorous alteration of a trademark might fail to qualify as a
successful parody can be found in the case of Source Perrier (Socidtd
Anonyme) v. Fira-Less Marketing Co.137  While this was a Canadian
decision, it would be interesting to consider whether a court in the United
States would reach a similar result if presented with the same facts under a
reworked TDRA.13 8  In Source Perrier, the defendant produced and
marketed tap water in green bottles under the parody mark "Pierre-Eh!" as
a spoof of the famous "Perrier" brand.139 The humorous alteration of the
Perrier mark was a playful reference to former Canadian Prime Minister,
Pierre Elliot Trudeau.14 0  Although the defendant's bottles contained a
disclaimer that its products were not to be confused with those of the
133. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting confusing or diluting
uses of famous marks).
134. Beebe, supra note 11, at 1146.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
136. See, e.g., Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corp., (1898)
15 R.P.C. 105 (Ch.), 112 (Eng.).
137. Source Perrier S.A. v. Fira-Less Mktg. Co., [1983] 2 F.C. 18 (Can. Ont. Trial Div.).
138. It is noteworthy that Justice Dub6 pointed out a normative similarity between
Section 22 and the dilution jurisprudence of the United States. See id. at 23-26.
139. Id. at 21.
140. Id.
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plaintiff, the bottles used by the plaintiff and defendant were physically
similar in shape and size.14 ' Despite the humorous alteration of the
trademark, the similarity in packaging might have been one of the factors
that prompted the Canadian court deciding this case to award injunctive
relief to the plaintiff.14 2 In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Dubd
held that the defendant's use did not qualify for protection as a parody, as it
amounted to depreciation of goodwill under Section 22 of Canada's Trade-
marks Act.14 3
How would Source Perrier be decided in the United States? Under a
reworked TDRA, such a case would likely fail the parody test, given the
significant similarity in the packaging of the parties' wares. The third
factor of the proposed six-part test, therefore, takes into account the degree
of similarity between the trademarks as well as the degree of similarity
between the wares sold under the respective trademarks. A parody which
sufficiently distinguishes itself from a famous mark and is used to sell
goods that are clearly different from those marketed under the famous mark
would stand a stronger chance of escaping liability for dilution. Hence, if
one could apply the reworked TDRA test for parodies to the Canadian
context of the Source Perrier dispute, the phrase "Pierre-Eh!" would more
likely succeed as a parody if it had been used to sell flags (for waving at an
election campaign) rather than bottled water. In this latter scenario, the
link between the phrase "Pierre-Eh" on flags and the famous "Perrier"
brand on bottled water would be too remote and tenuous to constitute any
kind of material connection between the two traders. In sum, the presence
or absence of "trademark use" should not be the only factor in determining
whether a parody is successful. Courts should look beyond this factor and
examine the degree of proximity between the marks and the wares
concerned in order to determine whether there is a risk of material injury to
the senior mark.
4. Is the parody being used, without justification, for commercial or
quasi-commercial ends to divert customers from the famous mark
owner?
The fourth criterion of the proposed test for parodies explores the
issue of whether the parody is being used for commercial or quasi-
commercial purposes. Although there is some overlap between
''commercial use" and "trademark use," the two terms are not synonymous.
141. Id. at 21-22.
142. Id. at 22, 26.
143. Id. at 26; see also Bereskin, supra note 11, at 1740.
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"Trademark use," which is dealt with in the third criterion, relates to
whether the parody is being used to designate the origin of goods or
services.144 On the other hand, "commercial use" is broader, and
encompasses all forms of activity that generate or seek to generate income
or revenue for the parodist.14 5 Hence, an artistic parody such as a drawing
or a painting sold to the public as a product in and of itself would be
considered "commercial use" but not "trademark use."
Like the third factor, commercial use is an important consideration.
However, commercial use, like "trademark use," should not be
determinative in the analysis of a parody's legality under the TDRA.
While an intention to derive revenue from the parody might be construed as
a desire to "ride on the coattails" of the senior mark, other factors which
might salvage the parody include the criticism of the represented mark, the
communication of a message of social, cultural, or artistic importance, the
expression of artistic creativity in communicating humor (even if that
humor might be considered lewd or cheeky in some quarters), and a clear
indication that the parody is merely an artistic representation of the original
mark.
An example of an artistic parody that would be considered acceptable
under the fourth criterion is the display described in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Products, in which nude Barbie dolls were depicted being
attacked by kitchen appliances. 14 6 Although the parody in this case was
capable of being used to generate revenue, the commercial or quasi-
commercial purpose of the parody was arguably outweighed by the social
message that it was seeking to convey.14 7  In contrast, even a non-
commercial parody with more prurient objectives-such as the use of
trademarked characters or symbols in sexual situations-may be viewed
less favorably if the parody does not seek to comment on or convey a
specific message about the trademark itself.148 Nevertheless, some of the
pre-TDRA dilution jurisprudence in the United States has highlighted the
importance of considering whether there is a message being conveyed by
the parody, rather than treating the mere fact of commercial use/non-
144. See Gunnell, supra note 11, at 457.
145. See id. at 460-61.
146. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. Id. at 796, 803.
148. See, e.g., Gunnell, supra note 11, at 459 (noting that courts in various jurisdictions
have provided a general sense of "what little tolerance they have for lewd, illicit or un-clean
parodies"). In contrast, Gunnell notes that "courts seem to have an extraordinarily high
tolerance for clean trademark parodies." Id.
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commercial use or sexual content as being determinative of the matter.14 9
For example, in the case of L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., the
defendants produced a two-page spread in High Society magazine called
"L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog," which sought to mimic L.L.
Bean's famous catalog in Hoffinan magazine. 150 The catalog was found by
the District Court to tarnish the plaintiffs reputation under Maine's anti-
dilution statute.' 5' However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit overturned this decision, holding that the defendant's sexual
parody was a form of expression protected under the First Amendment.15 2
The First Circuit's approach was based on a "fact-intensive inquiry" of the
defendant's parody,153 treating commercial or non-commercial use and
sexual content as merely contributing (but not determinative) factors in its
analysis of whether the message contained in a parody deserved
constitutional protection. 154
5. Does the parody distinguish itself adequately from the mark upon
which it is based?
This criterion seeks to ensure that the parody is clearly distinguishable
from the famous mark upon which it is based and that the connection with
the famous mark is of a nature that highlights the differences between the
mark and the parody, rather than their similarities. As mentioned earlier,
the play on the word "Chewy" in the Chewy Vuiton case to conjure images
of plush, squeezable toys for dogs, serves to convey a humorous message
while, at the same time, indicating clearly that it is not a product originating
from the senior mark owner.15 5  While there is some overlap between
criterion (3) (on "trademark use") and criterion (5), the requirement of
adequate distinction in criterion (5) applies generally to all parodies and not
just specifically to source-identification parodies.
A parody that mimics or emulates an established trademark in a
humorous way does not necessarily cause economic or reputational harm to
149. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir.
1987) (refusing to apply the anti-dilution statute because of its restriction on speech).
150. Id. at 27.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 32-34.
153. Gunnell, supra note 11, at 456.
154. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31 (asserting that neither the First Amendment nor the
history and theory of the anti-dilution clause "permit a finding of tarnishment based solely
on the presence of an unwholesome or negative context").
155. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260
(4th Cir. 2007).
1112012]
29
Lim: Of Chew Toys and Designer Handbags: A Critical Analysis of the “P
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the trademark owner. In some cases, parodies that are done "in good taste"
may, in fact, cast the famous trademark in a positive light. For example, a
parody that successfully distinguishes itself from the famous mark may
boost sales of the famous mark owner by drawing public attention to the
latter's products. To draw an analogy from the Chewy Vuiton parody, the
image of a Louis Vuitton customer carrying a Louis Vuitton purse while
accompanied by a pet playing with a Chewy Vuiton plush toy does not
necessarily portray Louis Vuitton in a negative light; rather, it builds upon
the senior mark owner's reputation in a humorous way and may, in fact,
indirectly promote the latter's products to potential customers.
In any event, there has been a strand of research in dilution theory
suggesting that strong, well-established trademarks are relatively immune
from certain forms of tarnishment,15 6 provided that confusion as to source
is unlikely.' 57 The relative invulnerability of strong marks to tarnishment
can be attributed to the "robust mental concepts" that these marks form in
the mind of the average consumer. 1s As such, if a junior user were to
market an inferior product in a non-competing field of activity, the negative
associations generated by the product in the minds of consumers would
likely remain "unidirectional," given the ability of many consumers to seize
upon fine distinctions between core brands and "brand extensions." 59 In
other words, the negative opinions (if any) would largely be confined to the
inferior product (or as the case might be, parody) without returning to harm
the goodwill and reputation that has been painstakingly built up in the
famous "core brand."1 6 0 If the insights from this research are applied to the
context of parodies, the harm caused by a "positive" parody may be
negligible. Instead, the famous mark being parodied may ironically benefit
from the increased exposure generated by a parody that leaves a positive
impression on the general public.
156. See, e.g., Sandra J. Milberg et al., Managing Negative Feedback Effects Associated
with Brand Extensions: The Impact of Alternative Branding Strategies, 6 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 119, 136 (1997) (investigating the relation between brand extension strategies and
the negative feedback effects of those extensions); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEx. L. REV. 507, 543 (2008)
("[D]ilution by tarnishment through the use of a similar mark on a shoddy product is
unlikely in the absence of source confusion because consumers have robust mental concepts
of strong brands.").
157. Tushnet, supra note 156, at 543-44.
158. Id. at 543.
159. Id. at 543-44.
160. Id. at 543.
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It is, therefore, important to note that not all parodies necessarily
criticize or denigrate the famous mark from which they were adapted. A
successful parody may have the effect of strengthening the brand
recognition and selling power of the parodied mark, instead of having the
opposite effect of weakening its distinctive quality. This is particularly the
case when a parody is generally well received by the public. In the case of
"Chewy Vuiton," the publicity generated by the chew toys may, in fact,
improve the public's perception of the senior mark owner's products due to
the positive reaction arising from the humor associated with the successful
parody. The consuming public may consequently be more inclined to
make purchases from the senior mark owner as a result of market exposure
arising from the distinction between the parody and the luxury goods in
question.
6. Is the parody being used as a target or as a weapon?
The difference between a weapon and a target lies in whether the
parodist's adaptation of the famous mark is of an offensive or expressive
nature. A parody which denigrates the integrity of the trademark by
subjecting it to distortion, mutilation or combination with other elements
that are completely incompatible with the trademark's character, can be
considered "use as a weapon." Such offensive uses of a trademark should
not be protected under the TDRA if the representation is not justified by a
suitably pressing reason, such as the communication of a message to the
public.16 ' A classic example of a case in which a parody was used as a
weapon is the "Snuggle Bear" case, discussed earlier under the
purpose/function of the parody factor in Part III(A)(1).' 62 The gratuitous
use of a trademarked image in completely incompatible scenarios for the
sake of entertainment or perverse pleasure should not be exonerated under
the parody provision, even if the parody itself is not being used as a
trademark to denote the origin of goods or services.
161. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 67, 71
(1992) (suggesting that a parody should only be protected if it is used as a target and not as a
weapon); see also Gunnell, supra note 11, at 468 (arguing that "target" parodies allow
criticism of cultural icons, while "weapon parodies" sever mental connections that branders
work hard to build in the minds of consumers and provide little social benefit). This Article
adopts a somewhat broader definition of "weapon/target" than does Posner. The discussion
focuses on whether the parody is being used in an offensive manner, although there is a fine
line between using a senior mark to attack another mark and using a parodied version of the
senior mark to attack another mark.
162. Conopco, Inc. v. 3DO Co., No. 99 CV 10893(JSM), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20510
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999).
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In contrast, parodies that function as "targets" seek to draw attention
to and poke fun at themselves in a manner that does not cause undue harm
to the senior mark's reputation. In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Productions, Inc., for example, the manufacturer of the canned luncheon
meat product SPAM objected to the appearance of a wild boar called
"Spa'am" featured as one of Jim Henson's Muppet characters in the movie
Muppet Treasure Island.163 Although there were amusing connections
between the character's name, its personification as a wild boar, and the
type of canned luncheon meat found in SPAM products, the parody here
was being done in good taste, and while the Muppet character was initially
portrayed (comically) as being fearsome and aggressive, its ultimately
positive behavior and endearing qualities were unlikely to cause
reputational harm to the canned meat manufacturer. 164 One might surmise
that the audience is being invited to laugh at the comically heroic and
endearing character that Jim Henson created for the movie (the wild boar
Spa'am), rather than at the canned meat manufacturer.
The example of Hormel Foods discussed above did not involve any
negative or denigrating use of the famous trademark.'65 However, if there
is evidence of such tarnishing use, the test for whether a parody functions
as a "weapon" should depend on whether the negative or denigrating use to
which the famous mark is subjected has any rational connection with the
trademark owner or its goods or services. A parodist who seeks merely to
gratuitously or arbitrarily subject a famous trademark to humiliating or
distasteful treatment without communicating a concrete, relevant message
about the trademark through the parody is harnessing the parody as a
weapon and is less deserving of protection under the TDRA. The case of
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, discussed earlier, provides
another interesting illustration of how the parodist's purpose or intention
was completely unrelated to the nature of the plaintiffs products or
163. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir.
1996).
164. Id. at 501 (noting that Spa'am was a comic character who seemed "childish rather
than evil" (quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 5473
(KMW), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13886, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995))). Although
initially menacing, the character comes to befriend the Muppets and helps them escape from
the film's villain, Long John Silver. Id. (citation omitted). This sympathetic portrayal of
Spa'am as a loyal and heroic character did not, in the court's opinion, tarnish the plaintiff's
reputation as a manufacturer of high quality canned meat products. Id. at 507-08.
165. Id. at 507.
114 [Vol. 35:83
32
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol35/iss1/3
PARODY EXCEPTION IN TRADEMARK DILUTION
enterprise.166 The depiction of oil flowing out of the plaintiffs beer can
and onto its famous trademarked eagle might have been a reference to an
environmental disaster site from which the plaintiff continued to use water,
although there was no evidence to show that the plaintiffs goods were
actually contaminated with oil.167 The somewhat accusatory nature of the
defendant's association between beer and oil depicted in the parody
arguably took unfair advantage of the famous trademark for the sake of
entertainment. The lack of an adequate connection in this case between the
message and the product concerned militates against allowing the
parodist's free speech rights to prevail over the plaintiffs interest in
preserving the reputation of its trademark from tarnishment
B. Delinking the "Trademark Use" Requirement from the Reworked
Parody Defense
In an effort to streamline the legislative provision for parodies under
the TDRA, this Article proposes the removal of the "other than as a
designation of source" clause for the parody defense.' 68 As mentioned
earlier, the current formulation of the Act confines the application of the
"fair use" defense to parodies that are not being used to designate the
source of goods.169 Such a formulation is unduly restrictive for parodists,
because it categorically excludes protection for all source-denoting
parodies, while uncritically immunizing all artistic parodies that do not
designate the origin of goods or services. An amendment to delink this
"trademark use" requirement from the parody defense would give
recognition to the possibility that certain forms of "trademark use" parodies
may be "fair" and should therefore be afforded some protection under the
Act.
Examples of source-denoting parodies that might deserve protection
under the TDRA are the marks "Gucci Gucci Goo" for baby gifts (a playful
reference to the Gucci brand)o7 0 and "Ballooningdales" for party supplies (a
tongue-in-cheek allusion to the Bloomingdales department store).' 7' While
these "parody-marks" are intended to be used as designators of source for
166. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1994)
(explaining how defendants used parodies of plaintiffs beer marketing slogans in mock
advertisements to raise awareness about oil spilling into the environment).
167. Id. at 772, 778.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006).
169. Id.
170. Gucci Gucci Goo, supra note 71.
171. BALLOONINGDALES OF WESTCARE, supra note 70.
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goods, they are sufficiently different from their respective senior marks to
avoid generating confusion or causing damage to the distinctive quality and
reputation of the famous brands from which they were "adapted." In
addition, the clever and witty nature of these "parody-marks" would serve
to reinforce the fact that they are separate from the senior marks being
parodied, thereby serving to strengthen, rather than weaken, the distinction
between the two marks. In this regard, the font, color, graphics, and overall
presentation of the "parody-mark" may also serve to highlight its difference
from the senior mark; difference in spelling would not be the only factor.
On the other hand, parodies that do not function as source identifiers
would, of course, also be eligible for protection under the reworked parody
defense. The crucial difference, though, would be that non-source-
denoting parodies do not receive automatic immunity under the reworked
provision. Whether a parody is being used to denote the origin of goods
should merely be one factor in determining whether the parody is fair; it
should not be determinative of the matter, nor should it categorically
exclude certain classes of parody from consideration.
C. Creation of an Independent "Parodies" Defense to Trademark Dilution
This Article's second proposal for amendment concerns the syntactic
detachment of the parodies sub-clause from the current "fair use" defense
and the creation of an independent defense under the TDRA dealing
specifically with parodies. While a re-worked parodies clause would still
be located under the "exclusions" section, it would be separate from the
"fair use" provision and, therefore, free from the rigid strictures of any
"trademark use" test. Such an approach would treat non-diluting parodies
as an autonomous, independent class of acceptable, non-diluting use, whilst
preserving the current structure of the other limbs in the "fair use"
provision.
The advantage of having an independent, "stand-alone" parodies
defense lies in its potential of conferring a flexible and nuanced approach
to determining the scope of protection for parodies, unencumbered by the
constraints of a "trademark use" test. A self-contained provision would
also obviate the need for a parodist to rely on factors outside the parody
defense and would provide a more comprehensive, integrated section to
serve as a guide for determining the scope of protection afforded to such
forms of expressive use. Taking into account the six-part test formulated in
this Article and the recommendations made in the preceding section
relating to the structural reorganization of the TDRA's "fair use" defense,
[Vol. 35:83116
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the "exclusions" provision of the TDRA should be reworked in the
following manner, with the material changes highlighted in bold:
(3) EXCLUSIONS. The following shall not be actionable as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other
than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services,
including use in connection with-
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services;
or
(ii) identifying ... ,criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the
goods or services of the famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark. 172
(D) Any use in connection with parodying the famous mark owner
or the goods or services of the famous mark owner, subject to the
following conditions:
(i) The parody is being used for satirical or entertainment purposes, or for the
communication of a message of social significance;
(ii) the parody does not damage the distinctive quality or reputation of the
famous mark;
(iii) the parody, if being used as a designator of source, does not dilute the
famous mark or create a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace;
(iv) the parody, if commercial or quasi-commercial, does not unfairly divert
custom from the senior mark;
(v) the parody distinguishes itself adequately from the senior mark; and
(vi) the parody is not being used as a weapon to denigrate the integrity of the
senior mark without just cause.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to highlight a number of concerns relating to
the parody defense in the TDRA of the United States. While the TDRA's
attempt to strike an equitable balance between civil liberties and private
rights is laudable, there are ambiguities in the language of the parodies
provision that would benefit from clarification. In particular, this Article
has identified two challenges pertaining to the interpretation of the parodies
clause. First, it appears to confer an inordinately high degree of
protection-blanket immunity from dilution-on all parodies which do not
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
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function as indicators of source. On the other hand, the parody defense
categorically excludes from its scope of protection all parodies that also
function as trademarks to denote the origin of the junior trader's goods or
services. Such a "black and white" approach is insufficiently nuanced to
accurately assess the impact of a parody on the distinctive quality and
repute of a senior mark. The fact that some non-commercial artistic
parodies may result in dilution by tarnishment, coupled with the recent
finding by a United States court that certain source-denoting parodies may
be "fair,"m173 highlights the danger of uncritically assessing the legality of a
parody based on the sole criterion of "trademark use."
In sum, the parody provision in the TDRA should be reworked to
provide a more flexible test for whether a parody is dilutive. The central
feature of such a test would be the assessment of the potential or actual
injury caused by the parody to the distinctive quality or reputation of a
famous mark. It is also important that the reworked parody clause provide
greater recognition to the harms arising from tarnishing use, which is the
most likely form of damage caused by artistic parodies that are not used to
sell goods and services. This Article has also proposed a six-part test to
assist judges in elucidating the factors which are relevant in determining
the legality of a parody.
While the ingenuity and creativity involved in re-casting existing
symbols in an amusing or humorous light are certainly qualities that ought
to be encouraged, the current formulation in the TDRA takes the rights of
parodists too far. Removing the "trademark use" bar from the parody
defense would be an important first step in recalibrating the balance
between the freedom of expression and private property rights in the
trademark law of the United States. Introducing a more flexible test for
measuring the impact of a parody on the famous mark would also help to
re-tilt the dividing line between diluting and non-diluting parodies and to
imbue the current Act with a greater sense of equilibrium.
173. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252,
268 (4th Cir. 2007).
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